A North Korean Thaw?
A year ago at this time, North Korean scientists were preparing to detonate a nuclear weapon underneath Mt. Mantap in the north-east corner of Korea (which they did on Oct. 9). Now, the Six-Party talks have been restarted, South Korea resumed shipment of fuel oil in July and the two Koreas leaders will meet in Pyongyang on Oct. 2 for only the second time since the Korean War. (The first such meeting was organized by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung in 2000, netting him a Nobel Peace Prize and the scorn of hard-line pundits on both sides of the Pacific.)
So, what happened? Why the turn around? Are things finally thawing on the peninsula? Is peace in sight, and if so, why now after North Korea took what was supposed to be such a devastating step?
Here are some interesting factors to consider:
1. The six-party talks between the U.S., North and South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, resumed in February after a fifteen-month hiatus (caused by Bush Administration allegations of North Korean money laundering). An agreement was reached stating that North Korea would shut down their reactor at Yongbyon and eventually disband their whole nuclear program in exchange for oil and food. In July, inspectors confirmed that the reactor had been shut down, and South Korea promptly delivered the first of the oil. The talks should continue to help push the North Korean's program closer to disbandment, or at least keep it inactive for a while longer.
But, the latest meeting, scheduled to begin last Wednesday, has been pushed back until Sept. 27, possibly because North Korea felt slighted by the allegations last week that it was working with the Syrians on their nuke program. North Korea is a touchy negotiating partner. The Bush Administration originally introduced the six-party Talks in order to avoid bilateral negotiations (because "we do not deal with terrorists"), but this, along with the "axis of evil" comment, insulted the North Koreans. Probably they only agreed to restart the talks because Bush agreed to negotiate bilaterally as well. The effectiveness of the six-party talks is limited. But talk is always better than no talk, in these circumstances. As James Baker has said, in this context, "it is not appeasement to talk to your enemies."
2. With less that 100 days left of his presidency, with elections coming up in two months, and with single-digit approval ratings, President Roh Moo-Hyun is traveling to Pyongyang next month to try to craft a peace treaty that has eluded the two Koreas for fifty years. What is he doing? And, more importantly, will he get a Nobel? While this summit is not likely to yield long-term results, it is a sign that continued dialogue is possible. Moreover, the leading candidate in the upcoming elections, Lee Myung-bak, is not likely to change course, even though he is from the conservative party.
3. Although I've not focused on this in my previous posts, Japan's interest in North Korea extends far beyond security. Korea was an imperial colony of Japan for the first half of the twentieth century, and all Koreans hate Japan as a matter of course. But Kim Il-Sung, in North Korea, made a name for himself as an anti-Japanese rebel. The South Korean government, in contrast, was made up of many officials in the Japanese colonial bureaucracy. North Korea has always seen itself as the true defender of Koreans against Japan. Moreover, during the colonial period, many Koreans emigrated to Japan, and many of them living there have over the years supported the North Korean regime. In the '60s and '70s--the height of intellectual infatuation with communism--Kim Il-Sung convinced many Korean-Japanese to return to the homeland, promising grand futures while plundering their possessions. (The book, "The Aquariums of Pyongyang," which I wrote on elsewhere, gives a first hand account of this situation.) In retrospect, this was probably bad financial management. Capitalism works better than simple thievery. (Yes, I read "Atlas Shrugged.") The Koreans sympathetic to the regime who remained in Japan continue to provide support, while those who emigrated have already been sucked dry. The Chosen Soren is an aid group based in Japan that funnels money into North Korea. It has been branded a terrorist group by the Japanese, and they cracked down on it after the nuke test. Much more than South Korea, Japan is a haven for pro-North Korea fund raisers and supporters.
Not content to trick hapless idealists, North Korea also kidnapped Japanese citizens in the '60s and '70s. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo "rose to prominence because of his advocacy of Japanese citizens kidnapped by the North," (International Crisis Group report). While keen to improve relations with China and South Korea, Abe intended to take a hard line on North Korea. His resignation this month, due largely to discontent over his hawishness, and the ascendancy of Fukuda Yasuo, a "dove," might be good signs for relations with the North.
4. Finally, China's role is important to underscore. As the International Crisis Group notes (op cit.), of the five major players in the region (Russia is a non-factor), only China has policy options--i.e. room to maneuver. This is due mostly to the North's dependence on China as it's only remaining trade partner. But it is also no doubt because China plays its cards close and is not afraid to talk privately and bilaterally. The U.S. and Japan seem increasingly ready to bargain with a nuclear Kim Jong-Il, but the corresponding change in the North's attitude might be largely due to Chinese arm-twisting behind the scenes.
Overall, the assessment of the situation is positive. It's always better to talk. And I see little reason to worry that Kim Jong-Il is simply buying time to make more nukes. For what? Nukes buy him prestige and a place at the negotiating table. He's got that now. In fact, the resumed oil shipments, the funds freed from the Macao bank and the aid that is continuing to flow, can all be seen simply as returns on an investment. Having the bomb pays. People pay attention to you.
Right now, it seem that the prospects of stability are better than they've been in a long time. Bush is negotiating, South Korea is negotiating, Japan has potentially changed course, and China seems to be helping the efforts. The North has shut down its reactor and agreed to inspections. But, the bigger question is: where does it end? What's the solution? Dialogue is the right way, the only way, but if our ultimate goal is a free and peaceful Korean Peninsula, we are a long way from it. This is no Pyongyang Spring. Internally, the country and its people are not better off; in fact they might be in the worst state ever. Our short-term strategy seems promising. But there also seems to be essentially no vision for an ultimate solution to the situation. Through negligence mixed with malice, Kim Jong-Il is on track to out-pace Hitler in terms of lives taken. And no one, including me, can see any way out of it.
So, what happened? Why the turn around? Are things finally thawing on the peninsula? Is peace in sight, and if so, why now after North Korea took what was supposed to be such a devastating step?
Here are some interesting factors to consider:
1. The six-party talks between the U.S., North and South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, resumed in February after a fifteen-month hiatus (caused by Bush Administration allegations of North Korean money laundering). An agreement was reached stating that North Korea would shut down their reactor at Yongbyon and eventually disband their whole nuclear program in exchange for oil and food. In July, inspectors confirmed that the reactor had been shut down, and South Korea promptly delivered the first of the oil. The talks should continue to help push the North Korean's program closer to disbandment, or at least keep it inactive for a while longer.
But, the latest meeting, scheduled to begin last Wednesday, has been pushed back until Sept. 27, possibly because North Korea felt slighted by the allegations last week that it was working with the Syrians on their nuke program. North Korea is a touchy negotiating partner. The Bush Administration originally introduced the six-party Talks in order to avoid bilateral negotiations (because "we do not deal with terrorists"), but this, along with the "axis of evil" comment, insulted the North Koreans. Probably they only agreed to restart the talks because Bush agreed to negotiate bilaterally as well. The effectiveness of the six-party talks is limited. But talk is always better than no talk, in these circumstances. As James Baker has said, in this context, "it is not appeasement to talk to your enemies."
2. With less that 100 days left of his presidency, with elections coming up in two months, and with single-digit approval ratings, President Roh Moo-Hyun is traveling to Pyongyang next month to try to craft a peace treaty that has eluded the two Koreas for fifty years. What is he doing? And, more importantly, will he get a Nobel? While this summit is not likely to yield long-term results, it is a sign that continued dialogue is possible. Moreover, the leading candidate in the upcoming elections, Lee Myung-bak, is not likely to change course, even though he is from the conservative party.
3. Although I've not focused on this in my previous posts, Japan's interest in North Korea extends far beyond security. Korea was an imperial colony of Japan for the first half of the twentieth century, and all Koreans hate Japan as a matter of course. But Kim Il-Sung, in North Korea, made a name for himself as an anti-Japanese rebel. The South Korean government, in contrast, was made up of many officials in the Japanese colonial bureaucracy. North Korea has always seen itself as the true defender of Koreans against Japan. Moreover, during the colonial period, many Koreans emigrated to Japan, and many of them living there have over the years supported the North Korean regime. In the '60s and '70s--the height of intellectual infatuation with communism--Kim Il-Sung convinced many Korean-Japanese to return to the homeland, promising grand futures while plundering their possessions. (The book, "The Aquariums of Pyongyang," which I wrote on elsewhere, gives a first hand account of this situation.) In retrospect, this was probably bad financial management. Capitalism works better than simple thievery. (Yes, I read "Atlas Shrugged.") The Koreans sympathetic to the regime who remained in Japan continue to provide support, while those who emigrated have already been sucked dry. The Chosen Soren is an aid group based in Japan that funnels money into North Korea. It has been branded a terrorist group by the Japanese, and they cracked down on it after the nuke test. Much more than South Korea, Japan is a haven for pro-North Korea fund raisers and supporters.
Not content to trick hapless idealists, North Korea also kidnapped Japanese citizens in the '60s and '70s. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo "rose to prominence because of his advocacy of Japanese citizens kidnapped by the North," (International Crisis Group report). While keen to improve relations with China and South Korea, Abe intended to take a hard line on North Korea. His resignation this month, due largely to discontent over his hawishness, and the ascendancy of Fukuda Yasuo, a "dove," might be good signs for relations with the North.
4. Finally, China's role is important to underscore. As the International Crisis Group notes (op cit.), of the five major players in the region (Russia is a non-factor), only China has policy options--i.e. room to maneuver. This is due mostly to the North's dependence on China as it's only remaining trade partner. But it is also no doubt because China plays its cards close and is not afraid to talk privately and bilaterally. The U.S. and Japan seem increasingly ready to bargain with a nuclear Kim Jong-Il, but the corresponding change in the North's attitude might be largely due to Chinese arm-twisting behind the scenes.
Overall, the assessment of the situation is positive. It's always better to talk. And I see little reason to worry that Kim Jong-Il is simply buying time to make more nukes. For what? Nukes buy him prestige and a place at the negotiating table. He's got that now. In fact, the resumed oil shipments, the funds freed from the Macao bank and the aid that is continuing to flow, can all be seen simply as returns on an investment. Having the bomb pays. People pay attention to you.
Right now, it seem that the prospects of stability are better than they've been in a long time. Bush is negotiating, South Korea is negotiating, Japan has potentially changed course, and China seems to be helping the efforts. The North has shut down its reactor and agreed to inspections. But, the bigger question is: where does it end? What's the solution? Dialogue is the right way, the only way, but if our ultimate goal is a free and peaceful Korean Peninsula, we are a long way from it. This is no Pyongyang Spring. Internally, the country and its people are not better off; in fact they might be in the worst state ever. Our short-term strategy seems promising. But there also seems to be essentially no vision for an ultimate solution to the situation. Through negligence mixed with malice, Kim Jong-Il is on track to out-pace Hitler in terms of lives taken. And no one, including me, can see any way out of it.
Labels: Korea, North Korea, policy
posted by Brian at 5:07 AM
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