North Korea as Linchpin
North Korea is the linchpin of East Asia--the stability of the region rests on Kim Jong-Il's maniacal shoulders. But, paradoxically, all this weight ensures the relative stability of the North Korean regime. No one can afford to have North Korea topple. So, it probably wont. The situation is remarkably clear--there is almost no reason not to deal with Kim, prop him up even. And Bush, who increasingly defines 'threat' as all and only Islamic fundamentalist governments, is increasingly willing to do just that.
I will look at the situation from the perspective of each of the regional players--the parties to the Six Party talks--to show that, for everyone's sake, North Korea must not topple.
Japan hates North Korea. Japan has a bloody colonial history in Korea--Koreans hate Japan back. Some in the South even feel some satisfaction every time the North puts a scare into the Japanese. So Japan might be a target for a nuke. It is useless at this point to say that Kim will not fire one off because of the threat of retaliation--the country is already devastated. Still, the possibility is more likely the less stable the regime gets. We should not assume that Kim or any of his generals will act for mere revenge, but if they decide that a major attack is necessary in order to establish their bargaining position, they may choose Tokyo or Osaka over Seoul. There's a lot of history over here. Japan, therefore, has incentive to keep N. Korea stable and less likely to start an international war. (By the way, some in Japan are pushing to get their own nukes, as a counter to the North).
China, for its part, doesn't mind the current situation at all, and would be terrified of a violent shake up. China is North Korea's largest trading partner--somewhat covertly developing mines and importing coal and iron ore. (Yes, North Korea does have foreign trade: $4.4 billion in 2005, especially "fish, clothing, coal, electrical appliances, and iron ore in that order" according to this article: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/24/bloomberg/sxore.php.) Given China's economic involvement in the country, and the complete lack of U.S. involvement, China is the likely winner after a collapse, establishing, perhaps, a more overt sphere of influence. (This sphere could encompass the South as well, whose largest trading partner is also China. The FTA with the U.S. could help to forestall this, which is another reason why we should support it.) Still, what could China do without Kim that they cannot do with him? China is able to deal with the North on an almost exclusive basis already. What interest would they have in opening the country up to other powers? Moreover, the collapse itself could be difficult. Millions of refugees, underfed, desperate, and vicious, would flood across the boarder. And China would have to get involved in the clean up, wasting valuable time and missing truck loads of resources. Can't this wait at least until after 2008?
Even though many people say they want it, South Korea is afraid of reunification. Because North Korea is full of weapons and starving criminals, the reunification itself would be devastating in terms of lives and property. South Korean rhetoric of late has emphasized the oneness of the Korean people, and some Koreans believe they would simply be joining hands with their brothers. But do not assume that the Northerners have been getting the same rosy view of the South. Some there, who still take the time to think about it, may view the South as imperially compromised, greedy capitalists whose property deserves to be plundered.
But even after the looting quiets down, or if it is managed properly, the cost of integrating the two societies, i.e. bringing the North up to a livable economic level, would be incredibly great. West Germany's economy was crippled for years after reunification, but East Germany was far more advanced that North Korea is today, and the West was, at the time, one of the most powerful economies in the world.
The U.S. has two obvious interests here: the safety and stability of South Korea and Japan, our biggest allies in the region, and the containment of Kim's WMD. Economic development of the North, while Kim is in power, serves neither of these goals. Every dollar north of the DMZ goes to the military. But, as we have seen, collapse also serves neither goal. South Korea's economic stability, at least, depends on maintaining the partition. And Japan may well be at risk if the regime dissolves. And all control over WMD would be lost, just as was the case with the dissolution of Soviet states. Some commentators have suggested that Kim could have been destroyed much earlier, and that the longer we wait, the worse the effects of his collapse. This may be true; but the damage would never have been zero. It always proved better to avoid any damage to the South or Japan, and to keep track of WMD, than to risk it. The U.S., therefore, is stuck with the track they have so far taken: keep Kim on his last legs perpetually.
Russia might be the only country that would not much mind a collapse--because of the damage it would do to the U.S. and China. But Russia does share a border with North Korea, and would have to deal with some refuges. And, suppose the U.S. or China somehow manages to effectively stabilize the country. Then this is just another example of a former Soviet client state that slipped through Putin's fingers.
After the nuke test on October 8, Philip Bowring pointed out that "The business pages record scant market reaction, even in South Korea where the share index has fallen less than 2 percent" because, he says, the markets agree with Kim's assessment that the U.S. would not attack because "his neighbors have far more interest in a stable northeast Asia than in risking chaos on the peninsula". This seems to be have been the right assessment.
And so, the status quo persists. For everyone's sake, North Korea must not topple...everyone that is except the North Korean people.
[A lot of my information came from this article: "When North Korea Falls" by Robert Kaplan.]
I will look at the situation from the perspective of each of the regional players--the parties to the Six Party talks--to show that, for everyone's sake, North Korea must not topple.
Japan hates North Korea. Japan has a bloody colonial history in Korea--Koreans hate Japan back. Some in the South even feel some satisfaction every time the North puts a scare into the Japanese. So Japan might be a target for a nuke. It is useless at this point to say that Kim will not fire one off because of the threat of retaliation--the country is already devastated. Still, the possibility is more likely the less stable the regime gets. We should not assume that Kim or any of his generals will act for mere revenge, but if they decide that a major attack is necessary in order to establish their bargaining position, they may choose Tokyo or Osaka over Seoul. There's a lot of history over here. Japan, therefore, has incentive to keep N. Korea stable and less likely to start an international war. (By the way, some in Japan are pushing to get their own nukes, as a counter to the North).
China, for its part, doesn't mind the current situation at all, and would be terrified of a violent shake up. China is North Korea's largest trading partner--somewhat covertly developing mines and importing coal and iron ore. (Yes, North Korea does have foreign trade: $4.4 billion in 2005, especially "fish, clothing, coal, electrical appliances, and iron ore in that order" according to this article: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/24/bloomberg/sxore.php.) Given China's economic involvement in the country, and the complete lack of U.S. involvement, China is the likely winner after a collapse, establishing, perhaps, a more overt sphere of influence. (This sphere could encompass the South as well, whose largest trading partner is also China. The FTA with the U.S. could help to forestall this, which is another reason why we should support it.) Still, what could China do without Kim that they cannot do with him? China is able to deal with the North on an almost exclusive basis already. What interest would they have in opening the country up to other powers? Moreover, the collapse itself could be difficult. Millions of refugees, underfed, desperate, and vicious, would flood across the boarder. And China would have to get involved in the clean up, wasting valuable time and missing truck loads of resources. Can't this wait at least until after 2008?
Even though many people say they want it, South Korea is afraid of reunification. Because North Korea is full of weapons and starving criminals, the reunification itself would be devastating in terms of lives and property. South Korean rhetoric of late has emphasized the oneness of the Korean people, and some Koreans believe they would simply be joining hands with their brothers. But do not assume that the Northerners have been getting the same rosy view of the South. Some there, who still take the time to think about it, may view the South as imperially compromised, greedy capitalists whose property deserves to be plundered.
But even after the looting quiets down, or if it is managed properly, the cost of integrating the two societies, i.e. bringing the North up to a livable economic level, would be incredibly great. West Germany's economy was crippled for years after reunification, but East Germany was far more advanced that North Korea is today, and the West was, at the time, one of the most powerful economies in the world.
The U.S. has two obvious interests here: the safety and stability of South Korea and Japan, our biggest allies in the region, and the containment of Kim's WMD. Economic development of the North, while Kim is in power, serves neither of these goals. Every dollar north of the DMZ goes to the military. But, as we have seen, collapse also serves neither goal. South Korea's economic stability, at least, depends on maintaining the partition. And Japan may well be at risk if the regime dissolves. And all control over WMD would be lost, just as was the case with the dissolution of Soviet states. Some commentators have suggested that Kim could have been destroyed much earlier, and that the longer we wait, the worse the effects of his collapse. This may be true; but the damage would never have been zero. It always proved better to avoid any damage to the South or Japan, and to keep track of WMD, than to risk it. The U.S., therefore, is stuck with the track they have so far taken: keep Kim on his last legs perpetually.
Russia might be the only country that would not much mind a collapse--because of the damage it would do to the U.S. and China. But Russia does share a border with North Korea, and would have to deal with some refuges. And, suppose the U.S. or China somehow manages to effectively stabilize the country. Then this is just another example of a former Soviet client state that slipped through Putin's fingers.
After the nuke test on October 8, Philip Bowring pointed out that "The business pages record scant market reaction, even in South Korea where the share index has fallen less than 2 percent" because, he says, the markets agree with Kim's assessment that the U.S. would not attack because "his neighbors have far more interest in a stable northeast Asia than in risking chaos on the peninsula". This seems to be have been the right assessment.
And so, the status quo persists. For everyone's sake, North Korea must not topple...everyone that is except the North Korean people.
[A lot of my information came from this article: "When North Korea Falls" by Robert Kaplan.]
Labels: Korea, North Korea, policy
posted by Brian at 1:19 PM
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