Open Migration: Burma

Here's a good piece on Burma in the New Yorker by George Packer. Burma's military junta, although it resembles North Korea's government minus the personality cult, is far more inept that North Korea. For one thing, it allows or even encourages some of its citizens to leave the country. As Packer writes, "The endgame seems to be a regime virtually without citizens."

So, Burma could be a good test case for my theory of open migration. What will actually happen to a regime that mistreats its citizens once they have all left? Will it become a no-mans land, populated only by the few remaining generals smoking cigars in their villas overlooking the deserted city streets? What would the costs of this sort of outcome be? There is value, for instance, in the history and resources of the land. Is it appropriate to forfeit these in order to "starve" a corrupt regime of its citizens? Also, will the regime be able to support itself even as it loses its potential workforce? North Korea, which prevents its citizens from emigrating, in effect holds them hostage, forcing South Korea and the US to send aid. This aid, even when in the form of food, is essentially just money in Kim Jong Il's bank. But, even if all of North Korea's citizens left and the aid stopped flowing, the regime would last for quite a while, I'd assume, by selling off natural resources, counterfeiting money or selling nuclear secrets. Will Burma's regime be able to similarly sustain itself? Will China continue to support it? We shall most likely see, since it is unlikely, unfortunately, that the regime will collapse without first losing all of its citizens.

A little chill in the air?

It's not yet September, but it's already feeling icy in East Asia. Check out this article about the anti-Korean sentiment on display in Beijing during the Olympics. As the article points out, it is too soon to tell whether or how this will affect relations between the two countries. But, I think it is worth noting how far from cosy bedfellows China and Korea remain a mere 16 years since resuming diplomatic relations.

Major commentators, from old Sam Huntington to Robert Kaplan, routinely lump Korea in with China, citing their proximity and their shared Confucian heritage. Often, they caution the US against letting South Korea fall into China's clutches, or in fact assume that this has already happened. But the US has a far sturdier position in South Korea than they credit. The US is the best ally Koreans have ever seen, bar none. Not more than a vassal to China for many eons, and an exploited colony of Japan's for half the 20th century, Korea has not had a lot of positive relationships with foreign powers. Though not perfect, the US has been a pretty stead-fast partner for the past 50 years. And China doesn't seem overly anxious to cut in.

Koreans, for their part, have fifty negative prejudices toward the Chinese for every one they have toward Americans. The Chinese are dirty, greedy, disorganized, lazy, manufacturers of inferior products and producers of toxic, heavy-metal-laden yellow dust. Americans are merely imperialistic and occasionally boorish. In sum, whatever negative sentiment the Chinese harbor towards the Koreans is more than mutual.

But, like it or not, the relationship between the US and South Korea has been cooling of late as well. Certainly there is anti-American sentiment in Korea, and the US has been seeking for sometime to reduce our military commitment to the country. The pending FTA has, if anything, exacerbated this chill, by stirring up issues--like Korea's absurd position on US beef, on the one hand, and US arrogance, on the other--that might be better to have left dormant. I have mentioned that Koreans would be right to have doubts about this FTA, and there may be good reason to have doubts about all such bilateral trade agreements, but it seems to me that South Korea had better hang onto the US as an ally or else risk being left out in the geopolitical cold. Korea, for all its industry, is a very small country that needs some friends if it's going to thrive. There is a good chance that Korea is never going to find good allies in East Asia. In a sense, the depth of this history here prevents, rather than facilitates, effective partnerships. The US might continue to be the best friend Korea's going to be able to find for a long, long time.

Dworkin on Boumediene (plus a few of my own ideas)

Here is an excellent summary of the background, outcome and effects of the Boumediene v. Bush SCOTUS decision, which I wrote about earlier. There is one point that I disagree with Dworkin on, however: I think that Justice Kennedy's wording is not sufficiently broad as to extend the writ to prisoners held in Afghanistan or Iraq. Kennedy makes a point of saying that Guantanamo has been in US possession for 100 years, unlike these locals. This was a big problem I had with the ruling, as I mentioned before. I hope Dworkin is right and not me, but anyway I imagine that this point will be challenged in many future cases.

I want to clarify, in passing, something I said on this topic in my earlier post. Many people (for instance, Amnesty International) argue that the Bush Administration has violated the Geneva Conventions in its treatment of war-on-terror prisoners. I think that a case can be made for this. Of course, in practice there is no court in which such a case could be presented....

But, in my previous post I was willing to concede the possibility that unlawful enemy combatants fall outside of the Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, I believe there is a strong ethical imperative not to torture or in any way violate the human rights of the prisoners. Bush should have had no reason to seek to avoid the guidelines of Geneva! Prisoners--that is to say, people--should always be treated with at least that level of respect.

Pundits and politicians (for instance, as Dworkin notes, McCain) often support Bush's evasion of Geneva on the grounds that we must hold on to terrorist suspects or else they will attack us again. But this is a bunk justification for abandoning Geneva. The current "war on terror" is not different from previous wars in this respect. It would be dangerous to release any enemy soldier before the war is over, and I agree that this war, or whatever it is, against al-Qaeda is not over. I would not be outraged if prisoners were held--even for the six years that some of them have been--as long as they were granted human rights (i.e., POW treatment) during that time, and as long as they could have the chance to confront the evidence brought against them in an open military setting. (Geneva grants prisoners charged with war crimes an appearance in a military court but not a civilian one.)

I think that there is one and only one reason why Bush tried to avoid Geneva: torture. It was assumed that torture would be needed in order to mine information from captured combatants/terrorists. But, again this not any different from any other war. It would have been useful, during the World Wars, to torture Germans to get information about their troop movements, but we didn't. We also did not systematically torture Japanese or Vietnamese, when we at war with them, even though they did not necessarily uphold our notion of jus in bello. (I'm sure that more torture went on than is officially acknowledged, but at least it was not official policy!) Why should it suddenly be ok to torture militiamen in order to find out the placement of roadside bombs? I don't want American soldiers to be killed, but this is not simply a cost/benefit analysis, where we trade the pain and degradation of the prisoners for the lives of our soldiers. This is a matter of justice.

And so, in conclusion, I'm going to segue into the issue of global justice. I think that, although most people claim to understand and agree about human rights, we have not actually worked out firm theories about the scope and force of justice on the global scale. What duties do we owe to people who are not citizens of our own country? What is the relationship between a group like al-Qaeda and the US, and what standards should each side adhere to? What happens if one side does not adhere to these standards? These are not questions about how to apply the Geneva Conventions or international law, but about what the basis for international law is or should be. The scope of these inquiries, moreover, should be global now rather than international, because we need to try to understand how people and states should interact with non-state actors as well as nations. Headway on these questions is the goal I've set for myself as I start grad school this fall. Stay tuned.

Phelps and Obama

Michael Phelps and Barack Obama represent a new, different kind of American ethos than, to take two people at random, Mark Spitz and Bill Clinton. Phelps and Obama are standard bearers of the post-baby-boomer nation, one that is no longer so ridiculously self-absorbed or patronizingly anti-establishment. I'm generalizing here, but bear with me. Contrast Michael Spitz, who, "sounding brash and cocky," predicted he would win six golds in Mexico City in 1968, with Michael Phelps, who consistently refused to talk about his eight-golds attempt. (Spitz won four that year.) Then, after winning seven in 1972, Spitz, aged 22, gave up swimming, signed with William Morris Agency, and set out on a Hollywood career. He did sports cometary and got a bit part in a show called "Emergency!" before fizzling out due to lack of talent. (Check out his IMDB page.) And then there's the mustache. According to this blog, Spitz grew the mustache "as a form of rebellion against the clean-cut look imposed on him in college" and then kept it because it psyched out the competition. To top it off, the Daily News ran this story just yesterday that quotes Spitz as saying that, if they raced in their respective primes, he would tie Phelps. I mean, come on. I've got nothing against Spitz, but he is very 1970s, very self-entitled, very, in a word, baby-boomer.

Phelps, as there is no need to report, displays a different persona. Just check out the difference in facial expressions in their pictures below. Sincere, hard-working, within-the-system, self-effacing even if self-confident, Phelps represents what is expected, what is valued, in 2008. I think that Spitz, if he were competing today, would not capture people's attention the way Phelps does. And Phelps, no doubt, would have come off as square in 1972.









The differences between Clinton and Obama are similar and just as striking. Clinton came on the scene 20 years after Spitz won his seven, but politics is always a little behind sport and pop culture. Clinton, only four years older, was clearly brought up in the same milieu as Spitz. And he displays many of his same attributes: a cocky, stick-it-to-the-system sense of entitlement along with a willingness to sell out to that same system at the earliest convenience. Obama, on the other hand, displays the same sincerity as Phelps, the same confident greatness without arrogance, the same aura of earnest effort. You get the leaders--and, I suppose, sports stars--you deserve, so perhaps we are collectively doing something right these days. Now we just have to win that election. Maybe we can get Phelps to campaign for Barack...

U.S. Troops in Korea: A blessing or a curse? For whom?

David Kaplan's most recent article for the Atlantic highlights the few things that Rumsfeld got right. His amazing blunder in Iraq is contrasted with his strategic success in reorganizing the military's global presence. Rumsfeld lowered the number of troops stationed permanently outside of the U.S., at bases in Germany, Japan and Korea, for example, and established instead many smaller, semi-permanent staging points scattered around the globe. Kaplan calls Rumsfeld's dealings with Korean and Japan "astute," for both strategic and political reasons. Rumsfeld managed to reorganize his troops without upsetting the delicate diplomatic relationships we have with Korea and Japan.

Specifically, in Korea Rumsfeld decided to reduce troop levels from 37,000 to 25,000, give the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul back to Korea, and hand-over wartime control of the Korean military--a control which the U.S. has had since the Korean war. Kaplan makes it seem like this reorganization was done in spite of the Koreans. Rumsfeld even threatened to remove all U.S. troops from Korea. It was the Koreans, not the Americans, who desperately wanted the troops to stay.

The story was quite different in the Korean media. What I heard about it, back in February of 2007, was that the U.S. had reluctantly caved to Korean demands for more autonomy and independence. This article (from the standard Korean news agency, Yonhap) makes the hand-over of wartime control seems like a concession to South Korea. The article reports that: "Operational control became a focal point as South Korea desired to command its own forces during wartime."

What's the truth? Did Rumsfeld give in to the Koreans or bend them to his will? Are Koreans trying to hold onto U.S. troops or kick them out? I'm inclined to believe Kaplan on this, but the wide variance in perspectives is interesting in its own right.

Korea itself seems to be massively divided on the issue. Some people see the situation as the U.S. imposing its will on Korea, and they hope for a total U.S. troop draw down. These feelings are stoked by incidents such as the accidental killing in 2002 of two school girls by a U.S. Humvee. On the other hand, other people see the U.S. military as the primary line of defence against Kim Jong Il and his budding nuclear arsenal. These people are practically begging the U.S. to keep the troops here. The election this year of Lee Myung Bak, a pro-U.S. conservative, was largely driven, I believe, by North Korea's 2006 nuclear weapon test.

See, for instance, this survey, from back in August of 2006, which shows considerable public confusion about the hand-over. A solid majority believed that the handover was a good idea. But 24% believed that the hand-over should happen as soon as possible, while over 33% said that the transfer should happen as late as possible. The middle ground--transferring control in the middle-term, as was actually agreed upon--drew less support.

The hand-over of wartime control is scheduled for 2012. This is also the year that U.S. troops will begin to vacate Yongsan. It will be interesting to see how Korean perceptions of these events develop, especially vis a vis changing relations with North Korea.

By the way, here is a totally, totally in-depth blog on us troops in korea: http://rokdrop.com/.

More thoughts on vigils

There is another protest planned for this Saturday at Kwang Hwa Mun in Seoul. The flier claims that 5 million people will be present. I may check it out.

Here, also, is a nice article on the level and variety of anti-American sentiment displayed at these protests. The old anti-dictatorship protests in Korea, to which this new generation of demonstrations is constantly compared, were virulently anti-American because of the continued presence of U.S. troops in Korea and the perceived roll the U.S. military played in dividing the country and in propping up the dictatorship. The current protests are different. According to the article, the current anti-American sentiment, insofar as it exists, is "practical" and issue-specific. People blame the U.S. for attempting to force beef back into Korea and other such things, but they do not seem to be rolling these all into a single anti-American hatred.

More to come.

North Korea Taken Off Terror List

Here. A major step towards reintegration, and perhaps reunification? Or another propping-up of a criminal regime. Time will tell...

Boumediene v. Bush

In its ruling on Boumediene v. Bush, on June 12, the Supreme Court decided 5 to 4 to grant the writ of habeas corpus to detainees being held at the naval station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, even though they have been designated enemy combatants and they are being held outside of the territorial United States. This means that some detainees can challenge their detention in federal court.

What is controversial about this decision is that the Supreme Court had to rule unconstitutional aspects of an act of Congress, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Court ruled that, contrary to the DTA, the so-called combat status review tribunals are not sufficient substitutes for habeas corpus, and that, contrary to the MCA, Guantanamo detainees are entitled to the writ.

The Court's decision hinged on the fact that the detainees were being held at Guantanamo. Because, the Court argued, Guantanamo is under de facto U.S. control, and has been for over 100 years, the Constitution has power there. This draws on case law going back to the Spanish American war, when, for instance, the Court ruled that residents of Hawaii were entitled to Constitutional rights even though the islands had not yet officially become a territory of the United States. Because the Guantanamo detainees were held within the purveiw of the Constitution, the Court held, they are entitled to its protection.

This is as opposed to prisoners of war who were captured, for example, during World War II and held in German prisons. Because they were being held outside of the territorial United States, on land that the U.S. was occupying for only a short time, the prisoners were not entitled to any rights afforded by the United States Constitution.

The German prisoners were, however, entitled to rights under international treaties of war, such as the Geneva Convention of 1929. They were not tortured, they were given honor and respect befitting their rank, they could communicate with their families and, under the Nuremberg Charter, if they were to be charged with a crime they were given public trials at which they could face the evidence brought against them.

These are all rights that the Bush Administration has denied prisoners held not only in Guantanamo but also in prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The prisoners at Guantanamo will now get their day in court, but what about all the others who have the misfortune to be held in territories that are not under permanent US control, out beyond the ken of our Constitution? The government has argued that, because they are not "lawful combatants," they do not deserve protection under Geneva. So, they are left with no legally enforceable rights. They are disrespected, hidden from their families, tortured and denied the opportunity to come before a judge. The Constitution does not extend to these prisoners, and a case can be made that Geneva does not, either. But the jurisdiction of justice and respect for human dignity has no limit. The US government should voluntarily offer these prisoners their basic rights, but, barring that, an international -- or, perhaps, global -- law should be crafted that would guarantee them.

Of Protesting: the Korean Candlelight Vigils

In my previous post I mentioned the candlelight vigils being held in Seoul currently. They are not planned in advance, but are organized over the internet with little warning. According to the awkwardly nomikered "The People's Countermeasure Council against Full Resumption of Imports of U.S. Beef Endangered with Mad Cow Disease", 65,000 people attended the June 6 protest and 20,000 people were expected for the June 13 protest outside of Seoul City Hall. The Socialist Worker claimed that there were 700,000 in Seoul on June 10, but I guess these numbers might be somewhat suspect. There has been at least a protest per week for the past month, and the crowd has evolved from a few thousand school kids to a group that cuts across all demographics. The aim of the protests, originally only to halt resumption of US beef imports, has actually expanded to encompass many political issues, including opposition to President Lee Myung Bak's Grand Canal scheme and the privatization of medical service. The protests have been remarkably effective, forcing the government to postpone US beef imports and to renegotiate with the US diplomats on the issue. President Lee has also agreed to scrap the canal if the people oppose it. The candles are intended to symbolize non-violence, a striking contrast to the pro-labor and anti-dictatorship protests of old. The protesters stay out till dawn singing old popular resistance songs.

Nevertheless, the police are cracking down heavily on the demonstrations, and there have been instances of violence. Police are using batons and tear gas, and, according to this article, from one of the pro-government dailies, protesters have damaged 58 police buses and hospitalized 16 officers. For the June 13 protest, the National Police Agency estimated that only 7,000 people would attend but that 10,000 police officers would be on hand. As I have written before, the goal was to actually outnumber the protesters. But there is something very different about these protests from the others that I wrote about. These protests are not allowed. They are contained, as much as possible, but they are not allowed.

The vigils are not sanctioned and, therefore, they are not impotent. They are, I think, actually a model for successful protesting today. They are internet-mobilized, frequent and visible. They are putting people in the streets, and they did not ask for permission to be there. They are non-violent in outlook but still a force of which the police must be wary. A good model to follow elsewhere, perhaps, except that Korea is unusual in that Seoul is the focal point of the whole country in a way that New York, for example, simply is not.

And here's a related question for my avid readers, whoever you may be: If I have the opportunity to attend one of these protests, as an observer, should I do it? I have respect for their method of protesting, but I have no real solidarity with these protesters and their concerns. The issues are not mine. I sort of think that protest is sacred, and that, if you are not actually an interested party, you should not sully the event with your indifference. I say this in light of reports I've heard that foreigners in Korea have started attending the protests just for a laugh. This seems reprehensible to me. On the other hand, perhaps it is one's duty to observe history when it is happening, like a reporter, even if it is not properly your history. What do you think?

Here's the beef

Last year, I wrote a few posts on the pending U.S.-Korea FTA. A consensus was eventually reached between the negotiators, and the agreement is currently waiting to be ratified by the respective legislatures.

If you go back and read my old posts, you will at least agree that the issues surrounding this agreement are complicated. It seems to me, for instance, that the U.S. should ratify the agreement simply for geopolitical reasons: South Korea is a close ally in a crucial region that has been drifting out of the fold of late. An FTA, if done properly, would more closely wed Korean and U.S. interests, and would enhance Korea's opinion of the U.S. Moreover, economists on both sides have argued for the economic benefits. Automobiles, for instance, seems to be roughly win-win: an FTA would open up the higher-end Korean market to U.S. manufacturers, so that they can compete better with Mercedes and BMW, while opening up the smaller car market in the U.S. to Korean companies, so that they can compete better with Toyota. On the other hand, Korean drug companies worried about increased competition and regulation in the Korean drug market, and Korean food companies and consumer groups worried about the lack of regulation governing U.S. food manufacturers. These are just a few of the contentious issues the negotiators had to work through in no fewer than seven drafts, each hundreds of pages long.

Nevertheless, the FTA has boiled down to one issue: beef. As I've mentioned before, after the mad cow scare in 2002, Korea banned all import of U.S. beef. Korea had been the third or fourth largest importer, but since the ban public opinion in Korea has hardened against U.S. beef as more and more news programs and journalists document the absurd practices that dominate the U.S. cattle industry--see, for example, "The Meatrix," which was featured in one Korean documentary.

But, Sen. Sam Brownback and others in Congress have stated explicitly that they will not support the FTA unless the Koreans completely lift the ban. And so, here we see the effects of democracy in America today: take an incredibly complicated issue, and cut it down to a sound bite that fits on the evening news.

The interesting thing is that the Koreans have taken up beef as the key issue as well. There have been a series of massive, daily protests against allowing U.S. beef back into Korea. Carrying candles--a clear sign that they are different from the petrol-bombing anti-dictatorship protesters of the previous generation--and stalling traffic around the main government buildings, the demonstrators have forced the government to halt the resumption of imports a few times over. Originally started by middle and high school students who organized on the Internet, the demonstrations have become a powerful political force here.

Here are some pictures from the Boston Globe to help you get an idea of the scope of it. (Thanks for the tip, Frazer.)

The latest on the beef dispute is that South Korea has decided not to allow imports of US beef that is from cows that are older than 30 months. This was a concession to the demonstrators in Seoul. Why 30 months? According to NPR, which has a helpful Q & A, "Mad cow has rarely been detected in animals younger than 21 months, so many countries feel mad cow disease will not be a problem in animals younger than that. The United States' safety standards regard animals younger than 30 months as safe for consumption, since the number of cases in animals up to 30 months in age is still extremely small."

The U.S., for it's part, has said that it is not willing to place a quarantine on been aged over 30 months, and that the U.S. beef companies should voluntarily comply with South Korea's wishes. This has lead to a stalemate, and the governments are "in talks."

So, keep an eye on this issue. I will update when I can.



UPDATE: The NY Times ran an article saying that the U.S. has crafted an agreement with beef exporters not to ship beef from 30-months or older cattle to S. Korea. Basically this is just the U.S. companies voluntarily agreeing to abide by S. Korean demands. It is not clear whether this will pacify the Korean negotiators, or protesters. We shall see. The Times also notes that Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT) has stated that he will support the FTA if, and only if, the Korean ban on U.S. beef is lifted.

Portrait of the Director as a Young Man

An observation: Did you know that, in "Chinatown", it is the director, Roman Polanski, who plays the man with the knife, the one who slices Jack Nicholson's nose and says "Hey kitty cat." (Check it out here.) You remember, of course, that Nicholson's nose stays bandaged and then scarred for the rest of the film. This is an extremely awesome, and literal, example of the director leaving his mark on a film. The bandage and scar become a sort of on-screen logo bug for Polanski--a constant reminder that you are watching his movie.

Obama

So, finally I'm going to write my endorsement of Obama, which has been a long time coming. I've been a big fan since before Iowa, but, anyway, it's time I finally wrote something about it.

There are many, many things I like about this guy. I like that he is not concerned with the old divisions--the baby-boomer divisions--in America. I like that he is reaching out to voters who don't usually have high turn outs: black and young people. I like that he recognizes all the mistakes that Bush has made--not just in foreign policy, but also in energy development and in taxing and spending priorities. I like that he is not populist in the old-fashioned way: he is not simply offering incentives to lower-class workers, he is trying to harness the changes that are happening in the world to radically alter what it means to be lower-class in America today: for instance by educating people better and upgrading the infrastructure in order to ease, rather than fight against, the transition to a service, information-based economy.

Another thing I like about him is his fundraising principles. Rather than try to take money out of politics--a noble but probably misguided strategy--Obama has radically democratized the donation-giving process. Obama is accepting millions of small donations from small donors who can pay online (like me), instead of relying on lobbyist or old political junkies intent on buying influence. Interesting to note that this was the intended result of the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002.

In sum, I think that Obama is the candidate of the future, and I am really thrilled to see that he got the nomination.

Here are two articles on Obama that I think are particularly interesting, both from the Atlantic: Joshua Green on Obama's fundraising; Andrew Sullivan on Obama as the candidate of the future.

A chink in McCain's armor...

McCain's Navy record given scrutiny here.

Global Migration: Status of S. Korean Migrant Workers

Here is a helpful little snapshot of the working conditions of migrant workers in Korea. According to Lee Cheol-seung, the head of the Office of the Gyeongnam Migrant Worker’s Council, migrant workers' "working conditions hover just above the level of slavery.” This is the point of supporting open migration: these workers are obviously necessary for the South Korean economy (otherwise they wouldn't be here), but because they are not given citizenship they are not given the rights afforded to citizens. It is worth noting that this figures appear to be for legal migrant workers, that is, resident aliens. God knows what the situation is like in Korea for illegal workers.